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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After a jury trial, Ms. Villa-Guzman was acquitted of a trafficking in marijuana charge
but found guilty of a lesser-included misdemeanor offense of being present where there are
controlled substances. She was also acquitted of a possession of drug paraphernalia charge, and
the jury did not reach a verdict on a possession of a controlled substance charge.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State filed a request for restitution pursuant to Idaho
Code § 37-2732(k). The State submitted a “Cost Sheet” in support of the request. However, the
request and accompanying Cost Sheet were unsworn. Further, the Cost Sheet reflected the
State’s time spent on the entire case; it did not did not delineate time spent on the different
charges. Additionally, the Cost Sheet did not indicate how the State arrived at the hourly rate it
used. Finally, the Cost Sheet included charges for time spent writing a brief, which responded to
the suppression motions of both Ms. Villa-Guzman and her codefendant. In sum, the State
requested $5,176.32 in restitution for all of the time it spent working on Ms. Villa-Guzman’s
case even though she was acquitted of two of the charges, and the jury did not reach a verdict on
the third.
Nevertheless, the district court granted the State’s restitution request in full after finding
that the request was reasonable in light of the nature and duration of the case. On appeal,
Ms. Villa-Guzman asserts the district court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay
restitution pursuant to the State’s request.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In August of 2016, law enforcement responded to a hotel in Jerome after the front desk
clerk reported there was a smell of marijuana coming from a hotel room, and children could be
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heard in the room. (R., p.201.) When officers arrived at the hotel, the clerk told them the smell
was coming from a room registered to Jesus Malagon, Ms. Villa-Guzman’s codefendant.
(R., p.201.) After initially entering the room to check on the welfare of the occupants—who
were not present when they entered—the officers secured a search warrant and discovered,
among other things, drugs and paraphernalia. (R., p.202.) Because Ms. Villa-Guzman was
staying in the room with Mr. Malagon, she was later charged with one count of trafficking in
marijuana, one count of possession of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia.

(R., pp.85-86.)

She and Mr. Malagon filed motions to suppress the

evidence, but the district court denied the motions after a joint hearing. (R., pp.201-08.)
After a three-day jury trial, Ms. Villa-Guzman was acquitted of the trafficking in
marijuana charge but found guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor offense of being present
where there are controlled substances. (R., p.545.) She was also acquitted of the possession of
drug paraphernalia charge, and the jury did not reach a verdict on the possession of a controlled
substance charge. (R., p.545.) Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State filed a request for
restitution pursuant to Idaho Code § 37-2732(k). (R., pp.460-62.) The prosecutor requested
$5,176.32 in restitution and attached a “Cost Sheet” that summarized the hours spent on various
tasks related to the case, but the Cost Sheet was not sworn. (R., p.462.)
The Cost Sheet included costs for the prosecutor’s time spent on charges for which
Ms. Villa-Guzman was acquitted, and the charge on which the jury did not reach a verdict.
(R., p.462.) Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor told the district court it had filed
the restitution request for “the time that the State has worked on this case.” (9/17/18 Tr., p.4,
Ls.11-15 (emphasis added).) The Cost Sheet included the prosecutor’s time spent on all three
days of the trial, which totaled 33.15 hours, and all the prosecutor’s time spent preparing for the
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trial. (R., p.462.) Neither the request nor the Cost Sheet indicated how the State calculated the
hourly rate it used, and the Cost Sheet included no itemization of the time spent prosecuting the
three separate charges. (R., pp.460-62.)
Defense counsel objected and argued that restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k) was not
appropriate. (9/17/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-20.) He noted that Ms. Villa-Guzman was only convicted
of the lesser-included misdemeanor offense and said, “I think almost all of [the restitution] is
attributable to the State going forward on the felony, and to lose on the felony counts and dismiss
the felony counts and then turn around and ask to be reimbursed for the entire cost of law
enforcement, including the State going to trial, I don’t think it’s the purpose of the statute for
restitution in this matter and . . . there should be no restitution in this case.” (9/17/18 Tr., p.4,
L.20 – p.5, L.10.) The State argued that the statute “allows for restitution on frequenting
matters” and noted it had “spent a lot of time” on the case, but said if the district court did “not
feel that the whole amount is appropriate . . . the Court can look at that and order what the Court
deems to be appropriate.” (9/17/18 Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.6, L.18.)
The district court ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman to pay the full amount of restitution the
State requested—$5,176.32. (R., pp.545-46.) With respect to the lesser-included offense, the
court wrote that the “offense falls squarely within the purview of the statute notwithstanding the
conviction was on a lesser included offense. The Court has reviewed the State’s itemized
restitution request and finds that the items for which the State is requesting reimbursement also
fall squarely within the purview of the statute.” (R., p.546.) It also stated, “The Court further
finds the request to be reasonable given the lengthy procedural history of this case including a
suppression motion, the defendant’s switching of counsel midway through the proceedings and a
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three day jury trial.” (R., p.546.) Defense counsel filed a notice of appeal timely from the
district court’s order awarding restitution. (R., pp.551-53.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman to pay restitution?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman To Pay Restitution

A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman to pay

$5,176.32 in restitution because the prosecutor’s Cost Sheet was unsworn. Additionally, the
Cost Sheet did not specify how much time was spent on charges for which Ms. Villa-Guzman
was acquitted or for which the jury could not reach a verdict. Nevertheless, the district court
awarded the full restitution amount the State requested. This was contrary to the language of the
statute and established precedent.

B.

Standard Of Review
The awarding of restitution under I.C. § 37-2732(k) is discretionary.

State v.

Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700 (2017). Therefore, the appellate court evaluates whether the
trial court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Villa-Guzman To Pay
Restitution Because The Prosecutor’s Unsworn Cost Sheet Did Not Constitute Sufficient
Evidence Upon Which The Restitution Award Could Be Based, And The State’s
Restitution Request Included Time Spent On Charges For Which Ms. Villa-Guzman Was
Acquitted Or For Which The Jury Could Not Reach A Verdict
Unsworn documents submitted in support of a request for restitution are not sufficient to

meet the State’s burden under I.C. § 37-2732(k). “[U]nsworn representations, even by an officer
of the court, do not constitute ‘substantial evidence’ upon which restitution under section 37-
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2732(k) may be based.” Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 702; see also State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692,
697 (2017). In Cunningham, the Court found that the prosecutor’s “Statement of Costs” was
“problematic for several reasons.” 161 Idaho at 700. It wrote that the Statement of Costs did
“not contain itemized time entries explaining the tasks performed or the expenditures made in the
particular case. Although it is signed, the signature does not purport to certify it as correct.” Id.
The Court also noted that the statute, “by its plain terms, grants discretion to award restitution to
the State for prosecution expenses ‘actually incurred.’” Id. at 702 (emphasis in original).
Therefore, it held, “[a]t a minimum, measuring up to section 37-2732(k)’s burden to prove
expenses actually incurred will generally require sworn statements that delineate the time spent
performing specific tasks.” Id.
In this case, while the Cost Sheet contained some time entries describing the tasks
performed, it was not a sworn statement. (R., p.462.) Therefore, it did not constitute the
“substantial evidence” required by the statute. The Cost Sheet also contained no indication of
how the State arrived at the hourly rate for the three attorneys listed. (R., p.462.) Additionally,
there were errors in the Cost Sheet. For example, there were two entries for .05 hours at lines
three and five of the sheet, but the dollar amount was $1.92 for the first one, and $0 for the
second one. (R., p.462.) Also, line sixteen of the sheet indicates the prosecutor spent 7.5 hours
on the “Jury Instructions/Witness list/Exhibit list,” but the dollar amount indicated for that time
is $17.28. (R., p.462.) Similarly, line twenty-nine shows the prosecutor spent 3.5 hours on
“Trial Prep,” but the dollar amount indicated is $172.80. (R., p.462.) As such, it was impossible
to determine the State’s costs actually incurred, and the Cost Sheet did not constitute substantial
evidence to support the State’s requested restitution.
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Further, a restitution request under I.C. § 37-2732(k) must make it clear that the State is
seeking restitution only for time spent on charges for which a defendant was convicted. In
Nelson, the Court noted that, “the Statement of Costs does not even state that restitution was
sought only for expenses actually incurred in prosecuting the charge resulting in Nelson’s
conviction, not those resulting in a mistrial, acquittal, or Nelson’s husband’s conviction.” 161
Idaho at 697. The State’s Cost Sheet in this case suffers from the same inadequacies. None of
the entries specify time spent on particular charges, and the State included its time spent on all
three days of the trial and apparently all of its trial preparation. (R., p.462.) The State also
requested expenses for its time spent working on “Research Brief Writing for Suppression”
(R., p.462), but both Ms. Villa-Guzman and her codefendant were listed as parties on the State’s
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Suppress. (R., p.173.) As such, the
district court should have required the State demonstrate—through a revised Cost Sheet or at a
hearing—that the expenses for that memorandum represented only half the time spent working
on it. The district court failed to recognize this.
It also failed to recognize that the State’s request included expenses incurred for
prosecuting all three of the felony charges originally brought against Ms. Villa-Guzman. But the
plain language of the statute makes it clear: “Upon conviction of a felony or misdemeanor
violation under this chapter . . . the court may order restitution for costs incurred by law
enforcement agencies in investigating the violation.”

I.C. § 37-2732(k) (emphasis added).

Ms. Villa-Guzman was not convicted of any of the felony charges; she was only convicted of the
lesser-included offense of the trafficking charge. (R., pp.456-57, 545.) Nevertheless, the district
court found that all “the items for which the State [was] requesting reimbursement . . . [fell]
squarely within the purview of the statute” and found “the request to be reasonable given the
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lengthy procedural history of the case including a suppression motion, the defendant’s switching
of counsel midway through the proceedings and a three day jury trial.” (R., p.546.) As such, it
awarded the full restitution amount requested. That award did not comply with the statute.
Therefore, the district court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it, and it did not reach its decision through an exercise of reason
when it awarded the full amount of restitution the State requested. Thus, the district court abused
its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Villa-Guzman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s award
of restitution and remand her case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
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